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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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File

Chief of Station, Frankfurt  
Attn: BDR  
Chief, FDM

West German Staybehind Planning

REF: NYD-11766

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1. The presence at headquarters of [ ] and [ ] has given us the opportunity for numerous discussions of the staybehind program, and more important, for the formulation of some concrete suggestions which may be regarded as addenda to reference memorandum.
2. As a brief background for our suggestions, we feel that the staybehind program has languished in Berlin, and to a lesser extent in Marburg, primarily because of the following reasons: (a) Lack of support and shifts of personnel at headquarters; (b) uncertainty both here and in the field concerning the relative importance - and hence, urgency - of the staybehind program; (c) lack of sufficient case officers in the field giving their evaluative time to the program; and (d) lack of indigenous principal agents (of the calibre of KIRITZ 15) who could uncover additional agents and organize nets in a manner comparable to the Zapper staybehind operation.
3. The problem at headquarters is, we feel, at least on the way toward being solved in a way which should insure more attention to and support of staybehind activities in the field. The importance attached to these activities can be demonstrated only by the solution of item (c) of the preceding paragraph; the solution of item (c) will, in turn, help greatly to solve the problem presented in item (d).
4. It is our strong feeling that additional case officers should be assigned to both Berlin and Marburg for staybehind work. Our tentative suggestion would be at least two and possibly three such officers at each of these stations. We should like to urge that we be permitted to reassign [ ] and [ ] to Berlin with the understanding that they devote virtually full time to staybehind activities. [ ] has already become thoroughly familiar with staybehind problems in the field. We have talked with [ ] who gets along well with [ ] and who feels that he would like very much to form the other half of the team. We believe that these two officers possess complementary qualifications.

which would have the makings of a good unit. In addition, they can both use their TDY time at headquarters to make a thorough study of our staybehind files and obtain additional knowledge in this field. It is our feeling, and theirs, that this program cannot be prosecuted successfully unless the destruction of other activities can, for the most part, be avoided.

5. The problem at Karlsruhe (or its successor station) should be solved in much the same fashion. One or two additional case officers should be employed here and thoroughly trained in staybehind activities; they should then be sent to Germany and placed under the supervision of [ ] whose time, in our opinion, should be completely freed for staybehind work. The job which [ ] has done, along with his other commitments, has demonstrated how successful the staybehind program could become in Germany with adequate personnel and support.

6. We should appreciate having the reactions of both SOS and SOS to the above suggestions. If there is essential agreement here and in the field, then the above plans should be put into effect as soon as possible.